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ABSTRACT
Although the k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity models have led
to a number of valuable privacy-protecting techniques and
algorithms, the existing solutions are currently limited to
static data release. That is, it is assumed that a complete
dataset is available at the time of data release. This assump-
tion implies a signiﬁcant shortcoming, as in many applica-
tions data collection is rather a continual process. Moreover,
the assumption entails “one-time” data dissemination; thus,
it does not adequately address today’s strong demand for
immediate and up-to-date information. In this paper, we
consider incremental data dissemination, where a dataset
is continuously incremented with new data. The key issue
here is that the same data may be anonymized and pub-
lished multiple times, each of the time in a diﬀerent form.
Thus, static anonymization (i.e., anonymization which does
not consider previously released data) may enable various
types of inference. In this paper, we identify such inference
issues and discuss some prevention methods.
1. INTRODUCTION
When person-speciﬁc data is published, protecting in-
dividual respondents’ privacy is a top priority. Among
various approaches addressing this issue, the k-anonymity
model [12, 10] and the ℓ-diversity model [8] have recently
drawn signiﬁcant attention in the research community. In
the k-anonymity model, privacy protection is achieved by
ensuring that every record in a released dataset is indis-
tinguishable from at least (k − 1) other records within the
dataset. Thus, every respondent included in the dataset
corresponds to at least k records in a k-anonymous dataset,
and the risk of record identiﬁcation (i.e., the probability of
associating a particular individual with a released record)
is guaranteed to be at most 1/k. While the k-anonymity
model primarily focuses on the problem of record identi-
ﬁcation, the ℓ-diversity model, which is built upon the k-
anonymity model, addresses the risk of attribute disclosure
(i.e., the probability of associating a particular individual
with a sensitive attribute value). As an attribute disclosure
may occur without records being identiﬁed (e.g., due to lack
of diversity in a sensitive attribute), the ℓ-diversity model,
in its simplest form
∗ , additionally requires that every group
of indistinguishable records contain at least ℓ distinct sensi-
tive attribute values; thereby the risk of attribute disclosure
is bound to at most 1/ℓ.
∗We discuss more robust ℓ-diversity requirements in Sec-
tion 2.
Although these models have yielded a number of valuable
privacy-protecting techniques [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11], existing ap-
proaches only deal with static data release. That is, all these
approaches assume that a complete dataset is available at
the time of data release. This assumption implies a signif-
icant shortcoming, as in many applications data collection
is rather a continuous process. Moreover, the assumption
entails “one-time” data dissemination. Obviously, this does
not address today’s strong demand for immediate and up-
to-date information, as the data cannot be released before
the data collection is considered complete.
As a simple example, suppose that a hospital is required
to share its patient records with a disease control agency. In
order to protect patients’ privacy, the hospital anonymizes
all the records prior to sharing. At ﬁrst glance, the task
seems reasonably straightforward, as existing anonymiza-
tion techniques can eﬃciently anonymize the records. The
challenge is, however, that new records are continuously col-
lected by the hospital (e.g., whenever new patients are ad-
mitted), and it is critical for the agency to receive up-to-date
data in timely manner.
One possible approach is to provide the agency with
datasets containing only the new records, which are inde-
pendently anonymized, on a regular basis. Then the agency
can either study each dataset independently or merge mul-
tiple datasets together for more comprehensive analysis.
Although straightforward, this approach may suﬀer from
severely low data quality. The key problem is that relatively
small sets of records are anonymized independently so that
the records may have to be modiﬁed much more than when
they are anonymized together with previous records [3].
Moreover, a recoding scheme applied to each dataset may
make the datasets inconsistent with each other; thus, col-
lective analysis on multiple datasets may require additional
data modiﬁcation. Therefore, in terms of data quality, this
approach is highly undesirable. One may believe that data
quality can be assured by waiting for new data to be accu-
mulated suﬃciently large. However, this approach may not
be acceptable in many applications as new data cannot be
released in a timely manner.
A better approach is to anonymize and provide the en-
tire dataset whenever it is augmented with new records
(possibly along with another dataset containing only new
records). In this way, the agency can be provided with up-
to-date, quality-preserving and “more complete” datasets
each time. Although this approach can also be easily im-
plemented by using existing techniques (i.e., anonymizing
the entire dataset every time), it has a signiﬁcant drawback.That is, even though each released dataset, when observed
independently, is guaranteed to be anonymous, the com-
bination of several released datasets may be vulnerable to
various inferences. We illustrate these inferences through
some examples in Section 3.1. As such inferences are typi-
cally made by comparing or linking records across diﬀerent
tables (or versions), we refer to them as cross-version infer-
ences to diﬀerentiate them from inferences that may occur
within a single table.
Our goal in this paper is to identify and prevent cross-
version inferences so that an increasing dataset can be incre-
mentally disseminated without compromising the imposed
privacy requirement. In order to achieve this, we ﬁrst deﬁne
the privacy requirement for incremental data dissemination.
We then discuss three types of cross-version inference that
an attacker may exploit by observing multiple anonymized
datasets. We also present our anonymization method where
the degree of generalization is determined based on the pre-
viously released datasets to prevent any cross-version infer-
ence. The basic idea is to obscure linking between records
across diﬀerent datasets. We develop our technique in two
diﬀerent types of recoding approaches; namely, full-domain
generalization [6] and multidimensional anonymization [7].
One of the key diﬀerences between these two approaches is
that the former generalizes a given dataset according to pre-
deﬁned generalization hierarchies, while the latter does not.
Based on our experimental result, we compare these two ap-
proaches with respect to data quality and vulnerability to
cross-table inference. Another issue we address is that as
a dataset is released multiple times, one may need to keep
the history of previously released datasets. We thus discuss
how to maintain such history in a compact form to reduce
unnecessary overheads.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we review the basic concepts of the k-anonymity
and ℓ-diversity models and provide an overview of related
techniques. In Section 3, we formulate the privacy require-
ment for incremental data dissemination. Then in Section 4,
we describe three types of inference attacks based on our as-
sumption of potential attackers. We present our approach
to preventing these inferences in Section 5 and evaluate our
technique in Section 6. We review some related work in
Section 7 and conclude our discussion in Section 8.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the key concepts of the k-
anonymity and ℓ-diversity models and brieﬂy review related
techniques.
2.1 Anonymity Models
The k-anonymity model assumes that data are stored in
a table (or a relation) of columns (or attributes) and rows
(or records). It also assumes that the target table contains
person-speciﬁc information and that each record in the table
corresponds to a unique real-world individual. The process
of anonymizing such a table starts with removing all the
explicit identiﬁers, such as name and SSN, from the table.
However, even though a table is free of explicit identiﬁers,
some of the remaining attributes in combination could be
speciﬁc enough to identify individuals. For example, it has
been shown that 87% of individuals in the United States can
be uniquely identiﬁed by a set of attributes such as {ZIP,
gender, date of birth} [12]. This implies that each attribute
alone may not be speciﬁc enough to identify individuals,
but a particular group of attributes together may identify a
particular individuals [10, 12].
The main objective of the k-anonymity model is thus to
transform a table so that no one can make high-probability
associations between records in the table and the corre-
sponding individuals by using such group of attributes,
called quasi-identiﬁer. In order to achieve this goal, the
k-anonymity model requires that any record in a table be
indistinguishable from at least (k − 1) other records with
respect to the quasi-identiﬁer. A set of records that are
indistinguishable from each other is often referred to as an
equivalence class. Thus, a k-anonymous table can be viewed
as a set of equivalence classes, each of which contains at least
k records. The enforcement of k-anonymity guarantees that
even though an adversary knows the quasi-identiﬁer value of
an individual and is sure that a k-anonymous table T con-
tains the record of the individual, he cannot determine which
record in T corresponds to the individual with a probability
greater than 1/k.
Although the k-anonymity model does not consider sen-
sitive attributes, a private dataset typically contains some
sensitive attributes that are not part of the quasi-identiﬁer.
For instance, in patient table, Diagnosis is considered a
sensitive attribute. For such datasets, the key considera-
tion of anonymization is the protection of individuals’ sen-
sitive attributes. However, the k-anonymity model does not
provide suﬃcient protection in this setting, as it is possi-
ble to infer certain individuals’ attributes without precisely
re-identifying their records. For instance, consider a k-
anonymized table where all records in an equivalence class
have the same sensitive attribute value. Although none of
these records can be uniquely matched with the correspond-
ing individuals, their sensitive attribute value can be inferred
with probability 1. Recently, Machanavajjhala et al. [8]
pointed out such inference issues in the k-anonymity model
and proposed the notion of ℓ-diversity. Several formulations
of ℓ-diversity are introduced in [8]. In its simplest form, the
ℓ-diversity model requires that records in each equivalence
class have at least ℓ distinct sensitive attribute values. As
this requirement ensures that every equivalence class con-
tains at least ℓ distinct sensitive attribute values, the risk
of attribute disclosure is kept under 1/ℓ. Note that in this
case, the ℓ-diversity requirement also ensures ℓ-anonymity,
as the size of every equivalence class must be greater than or
equal to ℓ. Although simple and intuitive, modiﬁed datasets
based on this requirement could still be vulnerable to prob-
abilistic inferences. For example, consider that among the ℓ
distinct values in an equivalence class, one particular value
appears much more frequently than the others. In such a
case, an adversary may conclude that the individuals con-
tained in the equivalence class are very likely to have that
speciﬁc value. A more robust diversity is achieved by enforc-
ing entropy ℓ-diversity [8], which requires every equivalence
class to satisfy the following condition.
−
X
s∈S
p(e,s) log p(e,s) > log ℓ
where S is the domain of the sensitive attribute and p(e,s)
represents the fraction of records in e that have sensitive
value s. Although entropy ℓ-diversity does provide stronger
privacy, the requirement may sometimes be too restrictive.
For instance, as pointed out in [8], in order for entropy ℓ-diversity to be achievable, the entropy of the entire table
must also be greater than or equal to log ℓ.
2.2 Anonymization Techniques
The k-anonymity (and ℓ-diversity) requirement is typi-
cally enforced through generalization, where real values are
replaced with “less speciﬁc but semantically consistent val-
ues” [12]. Given a domain, there are various ways to gener-
alize the values in the domain. Intuitively, numeric values
can be generalized into intervals (e.g., [11 − 20]), and cate-
gorical values can be generalized into a set of possible values
(e.g., {USA, Canada, Mexico}) or a single value that rep-
resents such a set (e.g., North-America). As generalization
makes data more vague, the utility of the data is inevitably
downgraded. The key challenge of anonymization is thus to
minimize the amount of ambiguity introduced by general-
ization while enforcing anonymity requirement.
Various generalization strategies have been developed.
In the hierarchy-based generalization schemes, a non-
overlapping generalization-hierarchy is ﬁrst deﬁned for each
attribute of quasi-identiﬁer. Then an algorithm in this cat-
egory tries to ﬁnd an optimal (or good) solution which is
allowed by such generalization hierarchies. Here an optimal
solution is a solution that satisﬁes the privacy requirement
and at the same time minimizes a desired cost metric. Based
on the use of generalization hierarchies, the algorithms in
this category can be further classiﬁed into two subclasses.
In the single-level generalization schemes [6, 10, 11], all the
values in a domain are generalized into a single level in the
corresponding hierarchy. This restriction could be a signiﬁ-
cant drawback in that it may lead to relatively high data dis-
tortion due to unnecessary generalization. The multi-level
generalization [4, 5] schemes, on the other hand, allows val-
ues in a domain to be generalized into diﬀerent levels in the
hierarchy. Although this leads to much more ﬂexible gen-
eralization, possible generalizations are still limited by the
imposed generalization hierarchies.
Recently, hierarchy-free generalization schemes [1, 2, 7]
have been proposed, which do not rely on the notion of
pre-deﬁned generalization hierarchies. In [1], Bayardo et al.
propose an algorithm based on a powerset search problem,
where the space of anonymizations (formulated as the pow-
erset of totally ordered values in a dataset) is explored using
a tree-search strategies. In [7], LeFevre et al. transform the
k-anonymity problem into a partitioning problem and pro-
poses a greedy approach that recursively splits a partition at
the median value until no more split is allowed with respect
to the k-anonymity requirement. [2], on the other hand,
introduces a ﬂexible k-anonymization approach which uses
the idea of clustering to minimize information loss and thus
ensures good data quality.
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we start with an example to illustrate the
problem of inference. We then describe our notion of incre-
mental dissemination and formally deﬁne a privacy require-
ment for it.
3.1 Motivating Examples
Let us revisit our previous scenario where a hospital needs
to provide the anonymized version of its patient records with
a disease control agency. As previously discussed, to as-
sure data quality, the hospital anonymizes the patient table
NAME AGE Gender Diagnosis
Tom 21 Male Asthma
Mike 23 Male Flu
Bob 52 Male Alzheimer
Eve 57 Female Diabetes
Figure 1: Patient table
AGE Gender Diagnosis
[21 − 25] Male Asthma
[21 − 25] Male Flu
[50 − 60] Person Alzheimer
[50 − 60] Person Diabetes
Figure 2: Anonymous patient table
whenever it is augmented with new records. To make our
example more concrete, suppose that the hospital relies on a
model where both the k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity are con-
sidered; therefore, a ‘(k,ℓ)-anonymous’ dataset is a dataset
that satisﬁes both the k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity require-
ments. The hospital initially has a table like the one in Fig-
ure 1 and reports to the agency its (2,2)-anonymous table
shown in Figure 2. As shown, the probability of identity dis-
closure (i.e., the association between individual and record)
and attribute disclosure (i.e., the association between in-
dividual and diagnosis) are kept under 1/2 in the dataset,
respectively. For example, even if an attacker knows that
the record of Tom, who is a 21-year-old male, is in the re-
leased table, he cannot learn about Tom’s disease with a
probability greater than 1/2 (although he learns that Tom
has either asthma or ﬂu). At a later time, three more pa-
tient records (shown in Italic) are inserted into the dataset,
resulting the table in Figure 3. The hospital then releases a
new (2,2)-anonymous table as depicted in Figure 4. Observe
that Tom’s privacy is still protected in the newly released
dataset. However, not every patient’s privacy is protected
from the attacker.
Example 1. “Alice has cancer!” Suppose the attacker
knows that Alice, who is in her late twenties, has recently
been admitted to the hospital. Thus, he knows that Alice’s
record is not in the old dataset in Figure 2, but in the new
dataset in Figure 4. From the new dataset, he learns only
that Alice has one of {Asthma, Flu, Cancer}. However, by
consulting the previous dataset, he can easily deduce that
Alice has neither asthma nor ﬂu (as they must belong to
patients other than Alice). He now infers that Alice has
cancer.
Example 2. “Bob has alzheimer!” The attacker knows
that Bob is 52 years old and has long been treated in the hos-
pital. Thus, he is sure that Bob’s record is in both datasets
in Figures 2 and 4. First, by studying the old dataset, he
learns that Bob suﬀers from either alzheimer or diabetes.
Now the attacker checks the new dataset and learns that
Bob has either alzheimer or heart disease. He can thus con-
clude that Bob suﬀers from alzheimer. Note that three other
records in the new dataset are also vulnerable to similar in-
ferences.
As shown in the examples above, anonymizing a dataset
without considering previously released information may en-
able various inferences.NAME AGE Gender Diagnosis
Tom 21 Male Asthma
Mike 23 Male Flu
Bob 52 Male Alzheimer
Eve 57 Female Diabetes
Alice 27 Female Cancer
Hank 53 Male Hepatitis
Sal 59 Female Flu
Figure 3: Updated patient table
AGE Gender Diagnosis
[21 − 30] Person Asthma
[21 − 30] Person Flu
[21 − 30] Person Cancer
[51 − 55] Male Alzheimer
[51 − 55] Male Hepatitis
[56 − 60] Female Flu
[56 − 60] Female Diabetes
Figure 4: Updated anonymous patient table
3.2 Incremental data dissemination and
privacy requirement
Let T be a private table with a set of quasi-identiﬁer at-
tributes Q and a sensitive attribute S. We assume that T
consists of person-speciﬁc records, each of which corresponds
to a unique real-world individual. We also assume that T
continuously grows with new records and denote the state
of T at time i as Ti. For the privacy of individuals, each
Ti must be “properly” anonymized before being released to
public. Our goal is to address both identity disclosure and
attribute disclosure, and we adopt an anonymity model
†that
combines the requirements of k-anonymity and ℓ-diversity as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1. ((k, c)-Anonymity) Let table T be with a
set of quasi-identiﬁer attributes Q and a sensitive attribute
S. With respect to Q, T consists of a set of non-empty
equivalence classes, where ∀ e ∈ T, record r ∈ e ⇒ r[Q] =
e[Q]. We say that T is (k,c)-anonymous with respect to Q
if the following conditions are satisﬁed.
1. ∀ e ∈ T,|e| ≥ k, where k > 0.
2. ∀ e ∈ T,
|{r|r∈e∧r[S]=s}|
|e| ≤ c, where 0 < c ≤ 1.
The ﬁrst condition ensures the k-anonymity requirement,
and the second condition enforces the diversity requirement
in the sensitive attribute. In its essence, the second con-
dition dictates that the maximum conﬁdence of association
between any quasi-identiﬁer value and a particular sensitive
attribute value in T must not exceed a threshold c.
At a given time i, only an (k,c)-anonymous version of
Ti, denoted as
b Ti, is released to public. Thus, users, in-
cluding potential attackers, may have access to a series of
(k,c)-anonymous tables,
b T1,
b T2,..., where |
b Ti| ≤ |
b Tj| for
i < j. As every released table is (k,c)-anonymous, by
observing each table independently, one cannot associate a
record with a particular individual with probability higher
than 1/k or infer any individual’s sensitive attribute with
†A similar model is also introduced in [14].
conﬁdence higher than c. However, as shown in Section 3.1,
it is possible that one can increase the conﬁdence of such
undesirable inferences by observing diﬀerence between the
released tables. For instance, if an observer can be sure that
two (anonymized) records in two diﬀerent versions indeed
correspond to the same individual, then he may be able to
use this knowledge to infer more information than what is
allowed by the (k,c)-anonymity protection. If such a case
occurs, we say that there is an inference channel between
the two versions.
Deﬁnition 2. (Cross-version inference channel) Let
Θ = {
b T1,...,
b Tn} be the set of all released tables for private
table T, where
b Ti is an (k,c)-anonymous version released at
time i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let θ ⊆ Θ and
b Ti ∈ Θ. We say that
there exists cross-version inference channel from θ to
b Ti,
denoted as θ ֌
b Ti, if observing tables in θ and
b Ti collectively
increases the risk of either identity disclosure or attribute
disclosure in
b Ti higher than 1/k or c, respectively.
When data are disseminated incrementally, it is critical to
ensure that there is no cross-version inference channel among
the released tables. In other words, the data provider must
make sure not only that each released table is free of un-
desirable inferences, but also that no released table creates
cross-version inference channels with respect to the previ-
ously released tables. We formally deﬁne this requirement
as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. (Privacy-preserving incremental data
dissemination) Let Θ = {
b T0,...,
b Tn} be the set of all
released tables of private table T, where
b Ti is an (k,c)-
anonymous version of T released at time i,0 ≤ i ≤ n. Θ
is said to be privacy-preserving if and only if ∄ (θ,
b Ti) such
that θ ⊆ Θ,
b Ti ∈ Θ, and θ ֌
b Ti.
4. CROSS-VERSION INFERENCES
We ﬁrst describe potential attackers and their knowledge
that we assume in this paper. Then based on the attack
scenario, we identify three types of cross-version inference
attacks in this section.
4.1 Attack scenario
We assume that the attacker has been keeping track of
all the released tables; he thus possesses a set of released
tables {
b T0,...,
b Tn}, where
b Ti is a table released at time i.
We also assume that the attacker has the knowledge of who
is and who is not contained in each table; that is, for each
anonymized table
b Ti, the attacker also possesses a popula-
tion table Ui which contains the explicit identiﬁers and the
quasi-identiﬁers of the individuals in
b Ti. This may seem
to be too farfetched at ﬁrst glance; however, we assume the
worst case, as we cannot rely on attacker’s lack of knowledge.
Also, such knowledge is not always diﬃcult to acquire for a
dedicated attacker. For instance, consider medical records
released by a hospital. Although the attacker may not be
aware of all the patients, he may know when target indi-
viduals in whom he is interested (e.g., local celebrities) are
admitted to the hospital. Based on this knowledge, the at-
tacker can easily deduce which tables may include such in-
dividuals and which tables may not. Another, perhaps the
worst, possibility is that the attacker may collude with aninsider who has access to detailed information about the pa-
tients; e.g., the attacker could obtains a list of patients from
a registration staﬀ. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
the attacker’s knowledge includes the list of individuals con-
tained in each table as well as their quasi-identiﬁer values.
However, as all the released tables are (k,c)-anonymous, the
attacker cannot infer the individuals’ sensitive attribute val-
ues with a signiﬁcant probability, even utilizing such knowl-
edge. That is, in each released table, the probability that
an individual with a certain quasi-identiﬁer has a particular
sensitive attribute is still bound to c. Therefore, the goal
of the attacker is to increase his/her conﬁdence of attribute
disclosure (i.e., above c) by comparing the released tables
all together. In the remainder of this section, we describe
three types of cross-version inferences that the attacker may
exploit in order to achieve this goal.
4.2 Notations
We ﬁrst introduce some notations we use in our discussion.
Let T be a table with a set of quasi-identifer attributes Q and
a sensitive attribute S. Let A be a set of attributes, where
A ⊆ (Q ∪ S). Then T[A] denotes the duplicate-eliminating
projection of T onto the attributes A. Let ei = {r0,...,rm}
be an equivalence class in T, where m > 0. By deﬁnition, the
records in ei all share the same quasi-identiﬁer value, and
ei[Q] represents the common quasi-identiﬁer value of ei. We
also use similar notations for individual records; that is, for
record r ∈ T, r[Q] represents the quasi-identiﬁer value of
r and r[S] the sensitive attribute value of r. In addition,
we use T A  to denote the duplicate-preserving projection
of T. For instance, ei S  represents the multiset of all the
sensitive attribute values in ei. We also use |N| to denote
the cardinalities of set N.
Regardless of recoding schemes, we consider a generalized
value as a set of possible values. Suppose that v is a value
from domain D and
b v a generalized value of v. Then we
denote this relation as v  
b v, and interpret
b v as a set of
values where (v ∈
b v) ∧ (∀vi ∈
b v, vi ∈ D). Overloading this
notation, we say that
b r is a generalized version of record r,
denoted as r  
b r, if (∀qi ∈ Q, r[qi]  
b r[qi]) ∧ (r[S] =
b r[S]).
Moreover, we say that two generalized values
b v1 and
b v2 are
compatible, denoted as
b v1 ⊲⊳
b v2, if
b v1∩
b v2  = ∅. Similarly, two
generalized records
b r1 and
b r2 are compatible (i.e.,
b r1 ⊲⊳
b r2) if
∀qi ∈ Q,
b ri[qi]∩
b rj[qi]  = ∅. We also say that two equivalence
classes e1 and e2 are compatible if ∀qi ∈ Q, e1[qi]∩e2[qi]  = ∅
4.3 Difference attack
Check Diﬀerence Attack
Input: Two (k,c)-anonymous tables
b Ti and
b Tj
Output: true if the two tables are vulnerable to
diﬀerence attack and false otherwise
if (DirectedCheck(
b Ti,
b Tj) = true) return true
else return DirectedCheck(
b Tj,
b Ti)
end if
Figure 5: Algorithm for checking if given two tables
are vulnerable to diﬀerence attack
Let
b Ti = {e0,1,...,e0,n} and
b Tj = {e1,1,...,e1,m} be two
(k,c)-anonymous tables that are released at time i and j
(i  = j), respectively. As previously discussed in Section 4.1,
we assume that an attacker knows who is and who is not in
each released table. Also knowing the quasi-identiﬁer values
of the individuals in
b Ti and
b Tj, for any equivalence class e
in either
b Ti or
b Tj, the attacker knows the individuals whose
records are contained in e. Let I(e) represent the set of
individuals in e. With this information, the attacker can
now perform diﬀerence attack as follows. Let Ei and Ej be
two sets of equivalence classes, where Ei ⊆
b Ti and Ej ⊆
b Tj. If ∪e∈EiI(e) ⊆ ∪e∈EjI(e), then set D = ∪e∈EjI(e) −
∪e∈EiI(e) represents the set of individuals whose records are
in Ei, but not in Ej. Furthermore, set SD = ∪e∈Eje S  −
∪e∈Eje S  indicates the set of sensitive attribute values that
belong to those individuals in D. Therefore, if D contains
less than k records, or if the most frequent sensitive value
in SD appears with a probability larger than c, the (k,c)-
anonymity requirement is violated.
The pseudo-code in Figures 5, 6, and 7 gives an algorithm
for checking whether two (k,c)-anonymous tables are vulner-
able to the diﬀerence attack. The Check Diﬀerence Attack
procedure in Figure 5 is the main procedure that checks for
the vulnerability between two tables bidirectionally.
DirectedCheck
Input: Two (k,c)-anonymous tables
b Ti and
b Tj, where
b Ti = {ei,1,...,ei,m} and
b Tj = {ej,1,...,ej,n}
Output: true if
b Ti is vulnerable to diﬀerence attack
with respect to
b Tj and false otherwise
Q = {(∅,0)}
while Q  = ∅
Remove the ﬁrst element p = (E,index) from Q
if E  = ∅
E
′ ← GetMinSet(E,
b Tj)
if |E
′ − E| < k
return true
else if (E
′ S  − E S ) does not satisfy c-diversity
return true
end if
end if
for each ℓ ∈ {index+1,...,m} // generates subsets
with size |E| + 1
insert (E ∪ ei,ℓ, ℓ) into Q
end for
end while
return false
Figure 6: Algorithm for checking if one table is vul-
nerable to diﬀerence attack with respect to another
table
The DirectedCheck procedure in Figure 6 checks if the ﬁrst
table of the input is vulnerable to diﬀerence attack with re-
spect to the second table. This procedure enumerates all the
subset equivalence class sets of
b Ti, and for each set E, the
procedure calls GetMinSets procedure in Figure 7 to get the
minimum set E
′ of equivalence classes in
b Tj that contains
all the records in E. We call such E
′ the minimum cover-
ing set of E. The procedure then checks whether there is
vulnerability between the two equivalence classes E and E
′.
As the algorithm checks the all the subsets of
b Ti, the time
complexity is apparently exponential (i.e, it is O(2
n), where
n is the number of equivalence classes in
b Ti). As such, for
large tables with many equivalence classes, this brute-force
check is clearly unacceptable. In what follows, we discuss aGetMinSet
Input: An equivalence class set E and a table
b T
Output: An equivalence class set E
′ ⊆
b T that is
minimal and contains all records in E
E
′ = ∅
while E  ⊆ E
′
choose a tuple t in E that is not in E
′
ﬁnd the equivalence class e ∈
b T that contains t
E
′ = E
′ ∪ {e}
end while
return E
Figure 7: Algorithm for obtaining a minimum equiv-
alence class set that contains all the records in the
given equivalence class set
few observations that result in eﬀective heuristics to reduce
the space of the problem in most cases.
Observation 1. Let E1 and E2 be two sets of equivalence
classes in
b Ti, and E
′
1 and E
′
2 be their minimal covering sets
in
b Tj, respectively. If E1 and E2 are not vulnerable to dif-
ference attack, and E
′
1 ∩ E
′
2 = ∅, then we do not need to
consider any subset of
b Ti which contains E1 ∪ E2.
That E1 and E2 are not vulnerable to diﬀerence attack
means that sets (E
′
1 − E1) and (E
′
2 − E2) are both (k,c)-
anonymous. As the minimum covering set of E1 ∪ E2 is
E
′
1∪E
′
2, and E
′
1 and E
′
2 are disjoint, (E
′
1∪E
′
2)−(E1∪E2) is
also (k,c)-anonymous. This also implies that if each E1 and
E2 is not vulnerable to diﬀerence attack, then neither is any
set containing E1 ∪ E2. Based on this observation, we can
modify the method in Figure 6 as follows. In each time we
union one more element to a subset to create larger subsets,
we check if their minimum covering sets are disjoint. If they
are, we do not insert the unioned subset to the queue. Note
that this also prevents all the sets containing the unioned
set from being generated.
Observation 2. Let E1 and E2 be two sets of equivalence
classes in
b Ti, and E
′
1 and E
′
2 be their minimal covering sets
in
b Tj, respectively. If E
′
1 = E
′
2, then we only need to check
if E1 ∪ E2 is vulnerable to diﬀerence attack.
In other words, we can skip checking if each of E1 and
E2 is vulnerable to diﬀerence attack. This is because unless
E1 ∪ E2 is vulnerable to diﬀerence attack, E1 and E2 must
not be vulnerable. Thus, we can save our computational
eﬀort as follows. When we insert a new subset to the queue,
we check if there exists another set with the same minimum
covering set. If such a set is found, we simply merge the new
subset to the found set.
Observation 3. Consider the method in Figure 6. Sup-
pose that
b Ti was released after
b Tj; that is,
b Ti contains some
records that are not in
b Tj. If equivalence class e ∈
b Tj con-
tains such records, then we do not need to consider that
equivalence class for diﬀerence attack.
It is easy to see that if e ∈
b Ti contains some record(s) that
b Tj do not, the minimum covering set of e is an empty-set.
Since e itself must be (k,c)-anonymous, e is safe from dif-
ference attack. Based on this observation, we can purge all
such equivalence classes from the initial problem set. As the
method in Figure 5 shows, our algorithm checks two tables
in both directions. While it may seem that this doubles the
already-heavy computation, this observation relieves such
concern.
4.4 Intersection attack
The key idea of k-anonymity is to introduce suﬃcient am-
biguity into the association between quasi-identiﬁer values
and sensitive attribute values. However, this ambiguity may
be reduced to an undesirable level if the structure of equiv-
alence classes are varied in diﬀerent releases. For instance,
suppose that the attacker wants to know the sensitive at-
tribute of Alice, whose quasi-identiﬁer value is qA. Then
the attacker can select a set of tables, θ
+
A, that all contain
Alice’s record. As the attacker knows the quasi-identiﬁer of
Alice, he does not need to examine all the records; he just
needs to consider the records that may possibly correspond
to Alice. That is, in each
b Ti ∈ θ
+
A, the attacker only need to
consider an equivalence class ei ⊆
b Ti, where qA   ei[Q]. Let
EA = {e0,...,en} be the set of all equivalence classes identi-
ﬁed from θ
+
A such that qA   ei[Q], 0 ≤ i ≤ n. As every ei is
(k,c)-anonymous, the attacker cannot infer Alice’s sensitive
attribute value with conﬁdence higher than c by examining
each ei independently. However, as every equivalence class
in EA contains Alice’s record, the attacker knows that Al-
ice’s sensitive attribute value, sA, must be present in every
equivalence class in EA; i.e., ∀ei ∈ EA,sA ∈ ei S . This
implies that sA must be found in set SIA =
T
ei∈EA ei S .
Therefore, if the most frequent value in SIA appears with a
probability greater than c, then the sensitive attribute value
of Alice can be inferred with conﬁdence greater than c.
Check Intersection Attack
Input: Two (k,c)-anonymous tables
b T0 and
b T1
Output: true if the two tables are vulnerable to
intersection attack and false otherwise
for each equivalence class e0,i in
b T0
for each e1,j ∈
b T1 that contains any record in e0,i
if (e0,i S  ∩ e1,j S ) does not satisfy c-diversity
return true
end if
end for
end for
return false
Figure 8: Algorithm for checking if given two tables
are vulnerable to intersection attack
The pseudo-code in Figure 8 provides an algorithm for
checking the vulnerability to the intersection attack for given
two (k,c)-anonymous tables,
b T0 and
b T1. The basic idea is to
check every pair of equivalence classes ei ∈
b T0 and ej ∈
b T1
that contain the same record(s).
4.5 Record-tracing attack
Unlike the previous attacks, the attacker may be inter-
ested in knowing who may be associated with a particular
attribute value. In other words, instead of wanting to know
what sensitive attribute value a particular individual has,
the attacker now wants to know which individuals possess
a speciﬁc sensitive attribute value; e.g., the individuals who 
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Figure 9: Record-tracing attacks
suﬀer from ‘HIV+’. Let sp be the sensitive attribute value
in which the attacker is interested and
b Ti ∈ Θ be the table in
which (at least) one record with sensitive value sp appears.
Although
b T may contain more than one record with sp, sup-
pose, for simplicity, that the attacker is interested in a par-
ticular record rp such that (rp[S] = sp) ∧ (rp ∈ ei). As
b T is
(k,c)-anonymous, when the attacker queries the population
table Ui with rp[Q], he obtains at least k individuals who
may correspond to rp. Let Ip be the set of such individuals.
Suppose that the attacker also possesses a subsequently re-
leased table
b Tj (i < j) which includes rp. Note that in each
of these tables the quasi-identiﬁer of rp may be generalized
diﬀerently. This means that if the attacker can identify from
b Tj the record corresponding to rp, then he may be able to
learn additional information about the quasi-identiﬁer of the
individual corresponding to rp and possibly reduce the size
of Ip. There are many cases where the attacker can identify
rp in
b Tj. However, in order to illustrate our point clearly,
we show some simple cases in the following example.
Example 3. The attacker knows that rp must be con-
tained in the equivalence class of
b Tj that is compatible with
rp[Q]. Suppose that there is only one compatible equiv-
alence class, ei+1 in
b Tj (see Figure 9 (i)). Then the at-
tacker can conﬁdently combine his knowledge on the quasi-
identiﬁer of rp; i.e., rp[Q] ← rp[Q] ∩ ei+1[Q]. Suppose
now that there are more than one compatible equivalence
classes in
b Ti+1, say ei+1 and e
′
i+1. If sp ∈ ei+1[S] and
sp / ∈ e
′
i+1[S], then the attacker can be sure that rp ∈ ei+1
and updates his knowledge of rp[Q] as rp[Q] ∩ ei+1[Q].
However, if sp ∈ ei+1[S] and sp ∈ e
′
i+1[S], then rp could
be in either ei+1 and e
′
i+1 (see Figure 9 (ii)). Although
the attacker may or may not determine which equivalence
class contains rp, he is sure that rp ∈ ei+1 ∪ e
′
i+1; therefore,
rp[Q] ← rp[Q] ∩ (ei+1[Q] ∪ e
′
i+1[Q]).
After updating rp[Q] with
b Tj, the attacker can reexamine
Ip and eliminate individuals whose quasi-identiﬁers are no
longer compatible with the updated rp[Q]. When the size of
Ip becomes less than k, the attacker can infer the associa-
tion between the individuals in Ip and rp with a probability
higher than 1/k.
In the above example, when there are more than one com-
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Figure 10: More inference in record-tracing
patible equivalence classes {ei+1,1,...,ei+1,r} in
b Ti+1, we say
that the attacker updates rp[Q] as rp[Q] ∩ (∪1≤j≤rei+1,j).
While correct, this is not a suﬃcient description of what the
attacker can do, as there are cases where the attacker can no-
tice that some equivalence classes in
b Ti+1 cannot contain rp.
For example, let r1 ∈ ei,1 and r2 ∈ ei,2 be two records in
b Ti,
both taking sr as the sensitive value (see Figure 10(i)). Sup-
pose that
b Ti+1 contains a single equivalence class ei+1,1 that
is compatible to r1 and two compatible equivalence classes
ei+1,1 and ei+1,2 that are compatible to r2. Although r2
has two compatible equivalence classes, the attacker can be
sure that r2 is included in ei+1,2, as the record with sr in
ei+1,1 must correspond to r1. Figure 10(ii) illustrates an-
other case of which the attacker can take advantage. As
shown, there are two records in ei,1 that take sr as the sen-
sitive value. Although the attacker cannot be sure that each
of these records is contained in ei+1,1 or ei+1,2, he is sure
that one record is in ei+1,1 and the other in ei+1,2. Thus,
he can make an arbitrary choice and update his knowledge
about the quasi-identiﬁers of the two records accordingly.
Using such techniques, the attacker can make more precise
inference by eliminating equivalence classes in
b Ti+1 that are
impossible to contain rp.
We now describe a more thorough algorithm that checks
two (k,c)-anonymous tables for the vulnerability to the
record-tracing attack. First, we construct a bipartite graph
G = (V,E), where V = V1 ∪ V2 and each vertex in V1 rep-
resents a record in
b Ti, and each vertex in V2 represents a
record in
b Ti+1 that is compatible with at least one record in
b Ti. We deﬁne E as the set of edges from vertices in V1 to
vertices in V2, which represents possible matching relation-
ships. That is, if there is an edge from ri ∈ V1 to rj ∈ V2,
this means that records ri and rj may both correspond to
the same record although they are generalized into diﬀerent
forms. We create such edges between V1 and V2 as follows.
For each vertex r ∈ V1, we ﬁnd from V2 the set of records
R where ∀ri ∈ R,(r[Q] ⊲⊳ ri[Q]) ∧ (r[S] = ri[S]). If |R| = 1
and r
′ ∈ E, then we create an edge from r to r
′ and mark
it with  d , which indicates that r deﬁnitely corresponds to
r
′. If |R| > 1, then we create an edge from r and every
r
′
i ∈ R and mark it with  p  to indicate that r plausibly cor-
responds to r
′
i. Now given the constructed bipartite graph,
the pseudo-code in Figure 11 removes plausible edges that
are not feasible and discovers more deﬁnite edges by scan-
ning through the edges.
Note that the algorithm above does not handle the case
illustrated in Figure 10(ii). In order to address such cases,
we also performs the following. For each equivalence classRemove Infeasible Edges
Input: A bipartite graph G = (V,E) where V = V1∪V2
and E is a set of edges representing possible matching
relationships.
Output: A bipartite graph G
′ = (V,E
′) where E
′ ⊂ E
with infeasible edges removed
E
′ = E
while true
change1 ← false
change2 ← false
for each rj ∈ V2
e ← all the incoming edges of rj if e contains
both a deﬁnite edge and plausible edge(s)
remove all plausible edges in e from E
′
change1 ← true
end if
end for
if change1 = true
for each ri ∈ V1
e ← all the outgoing edges of ri
if e contains only a single plausible edge
mark the edge in e as deﬁnite
change2 ← true
end if
end for
end if
if change2 = false
break
end if
end while
return (V,E
′)
Figure 11: Algorithm for removing infeasible edges
from a bipartite graph
e1,i ∈
b Ti, we ﬁnd from
b Tj the set of equivalence classes E
where ∀e2,j ∈ E,e1,i[Q] ⊲⊳ e2,j[Q]. If the same number of
records with any sensitive value s appear in both e1,i and
E, we remove unnecessary plausible edges such that each of
such records in e1,i has a deﬁnite edge to a distinct record
in E.
After all infeasible edges are removed, each record r1,i ∈
V1 is associated with a set of possibly matching records
{r2,j,...,r2,m} (j ≤ m) in V2. Now we can follow the edges
and compute for each record r1,i ∈
b Ti the inferrable quasi-
identiﬁer r
′
1,i[Q] = r1,i[Q] ∩ (
S
ℓ=j,...,m r2,ℓ[Q]). If any
inferred quasi-identifer maps to less than k individuals in
the population table Ui, then table
b Ti is vulnerable to the
record-tracing attack with respect to
b Tj.
It is worth noting that the key problem enabling the
record-tracing attack arises from the fact that the sensitive
attribute value of a record, together with its generalized
quasi-identiﬁer, may uniquely identify the record in diﬀer-
ent anonymous tables. This issue can be especially critical
for records with rare sensitive attribute values (e.g., rare dis-
eases) or tables where every individual has a unique sensitive
attribute value (e.g., DNA sequence).
5. INFERENCE PREVENTION
In this section, we describe our incremental data
anonymization which incorporates the inference detection
techniques in the previous section. We ﬁrst describe our
data/history management strategy which aims to reduce the
computational overheads. Then, we describe the properties
of our checking algorithms which make them suitable for
existing data anonymization techniques such as full-domain
generalization [6] and multidimensional anonymization [7].
5.1 Data/history management
Consider a newly anonymized table,
b Ti, which is about
to be released. In order to check whether
b Ti is vulnera-
ble to cross-version inferences, it is essential to maintain
some form of history about previously released datasets,
Θ = {
b T0,...,
b Ti−1}. However, checking the vulnerability
in
b Ti against each table in Θ can be computationally expen-
sive. To avoid such ineﬃciency, we maintain a history table,
H, which has the following attributes.
• RID : is a unique record ID (or the explicit identiﬁer
of the corresponding individual). Assuming that each
b Ti also contains RID (which is projected out before
being released), RID is used to join Hi and
b Ti.
• TS (Time Stamp) : represents the time (or the version
number) when the record is ﬁrst released.
• IS (Inferable Sensitive values) : stores the set of sensi-
tive attribute values with which the record can be as-
sociated. For instance, if record r is released in equiv-
alence class ei of
b Ti, then r[IS]i ← (r[IS]i−1 ∩ ei S ).
This ﬁeld is used for checking vulnerability to intersec-
tion attack.
• IQ (Inferable Quasi-identiﬁer) : keeps track of the
quasi-identiﬁers into which the record has previously
been generalized. For instance, for record r ∈
b Ti,
r[IQ]i ← r[IQ]i−1 ∩ r[Q]. This ﬁeld is used for check-
ing vulnerability to record-tracing attack.
The main idea of H is to keep track of the attacker’s ac-
cumulated knowledge on each released record. For instance,
value r[IS] of record r ∈ Hi−1 indicates the set of sensitive
attribute values that the attacker may be able to associate
with r prior to the release of
b Ti. This is indeed the worst case
as we are assuming that the attacker possesses every released
table, i.e., Θ. However, as discussed in Section 4.1, we need
to be conservative when estimating what the attacker can
do. Using H, the cost of checking
b Ti for vulnerability can
be signiﬁcantly reduced; for intersection and record-tracing
attacks, we check
b Ti against Hi−1, instead of every
b Tj ∈ Θ
‡ .
5.2 Incorporating inference detection into
data anonymization
We now discuss how to incorporate the inference detection
algorithms into secure anonymization algorithms. We ﬁrst
consider the full-domain anonymization, where all values of
an attribute are consistently generalized to the same level
in the predeﬁned generalization hierarchy. In [6], LeFevre et
al. propose an algorithm that ﬁnds minimal generalizations
for a given table. In its essence, the proposed algorithm
is an bottom-up search approach in that it starts with un-
generalized data and tries to ﬁnd minimal generalizations by
‡In our current implementation, diﬀerence attack is still
checked against every previously released table.increasingly generalizing the target data in each step. The
key property on which the algorithm relies is generalization
property: given a table T and two generalization strategies
G1, G2 (G1   G2), if G1(T) is k-anonymous, then G2(T)
is also k-anonymous
§ . Although intuitive, this property is
critical as it guarantees the optimality to the discovered so-
lutions; i.e., once the search ﬁnds a generalization level that
satisﬁes the k-anonymity requirement, we do not need to
search further.
Observation 4. Given a table T and two generalization
strategies G1, G2 (G1   G2), if G1(T) is not vulnerable to
any inference attack, then neither is G2(T).
The proof is simple. As each equivalence class in G2(T)
is the union of one or more equivalence classes in G1(T),
the information about each record in G2(T) is more vague
than that in G1(T); thus, G2 does not create more inference
attacks than G1. Based on this observation, we modify the
algorithm in [6] as follows. In each step of generalization, in
addition to checking the (k,c)-anonymity requirement, we
also checks for the vulnerability to inference. If either check
fails, then we need to further generalize the data.
Next, we consider the multidimensional k-anonymity al-
gorithm proposed in [7]. Speciﬁcally, the algorithm consists
of the following two steps. The ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd a par-
titioning scheme of the d-dimensional space, where d is the
number of attributes in the quasi-identiﬁer, such that each
partition contains more than k records. In order to ﬁnd such
a partitioning, the algorithm recursively splits a partition
at the median value (of a selected dimension) until no more
split is allowed with respect to the k-anonymity require-
ment. Note that contrast to the previous algorithm, this
algorithm is a top-down search approach, and the quality of
the search relies on the following property
¶ : given a partition
p, if p does not satisfy the k-anonymity requirement, then
any sub-partition of p does not satisfy the requirement.
Observation 5. Given a partition p of records, if p is vul-
nerable to any inference attack, then so is any sub-partition
of p.
Suppose that we have a partition P1 of the dataset, in
which some records are vulnerable to inference attacks.
Then, any further cut of P1 will lead to a dataset that is
also vulnerable to inference attacks. This is based on the
fact that any further cut on P1 leads to de-generalization
of the dataset; thus, it reveals more information about each
record than P1. Based on this observation, we modify the
algorithm in [7] as follow. In each step of partition, in addi-
tion to checking the (k,c)-anonymity requirement, we also
checks for the vulnerability to inference. If either check fails,
then we do not need to further partition the data.
6. EXPERIMENTS
The main goal of our experiments is to show that our
approach eﬀectively prevents the previously discussed infer-
ence attacks when data is incrementally disseminated. We
also show that our approach produces datasets with good
data quality. We ﬁrst describe our experimental settings
and then report our experimental results.
§This property is also used in [8] for ℓ-diversity and is thus
applicable for (k,c)-anonymity.
¶It is easy to see that the property also holds for any diver-
sity requirement.
6.1 Experimental Setup
6.1.1 Experimental Environment
The experiments were performed on a 2.66 GHz Intel IV
processor machine with 1 GB of RAM. The operating sys-
tem on the machine was Microsoft Windows XP Professional
Edition, and the implementation was built and run in Java
2 Platform, Standard Edition 5.0. For our experiments, we
used the Adult dataset from the UC Irvine Machine Learn-
ing Repository [9], which is considered a de facto benchmark
for evaluating the performance of anonymization algorithms.
Before the experiments, the Adult data set was prepared as
described in [1, 5, 7]. We removed records with missing
values and retained only nine of the original attributes. In
our experiments, we considered {age, work class, education,
marital status, race, gender, native country, salary} as the
quasi-identiﬁer, and occupation attribute as the sensitive at-
tribute.
6.1.2 Data quality metrics
The quality of generalized data has been measured by var-
ious metric. In our experiment, we measure the data quality
mainly based on Average Information Loss (AIL, for short)
metric proposed in [2]. The basic idea of AIL metric is
that the amount of generalization is equivalent to the ex-
pansion of each equivalence class (i.e., the geometrical size
of each partition). Note that as all the records in an equiv-
alence class are modiﬁed to share the same quasi-identifer,
each region indeed represents the generalized quasi-identiﬁer
of the records contained in it. Thus, data distortion can
be measured naturally by the size of the region covered by
each equivalence class. Following this idea, IL measures the
amount of data distortion in an equivalence class as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. (Information loss) [2] Let e={r1,...,rn}
be an equivalence class where Q={a1,...,am}. Then the
amount of data distortion occurred by generalizing e, de-
noted by AIL(e), is deﬁned as:
AIL(e) = |e| ×
P
j=1,...,m
|Gj|
|Dj|
where |e| is the number of records in e, and |Dj| the do-
main size of attribute aj. |Gj| represents the amount of
generalization in attribute aj (e.g., the length of the short-
est interval which contains all the aj values existing in e).
Based on IL, the average information loss of a given table
b T is computed as: AIL(
b T) = (
P
e∈
b T IL(e)) / |T|. The key
advantage of AIL metric is that it precisely measures the
amount of generalization (or vagueness of data), while be-
ing independent from the underlying generalization scheme
(e.g, anonymization technique used or generalization hier-
archies assumed). For the same reason, we also use the
Discernibility Metric (DM) [1] as another quality measure
in our experiment. Intuitively, DM measures the quality of
anonymized data based on the size of the equivalence classes,
which indicates how much records are indistinguishable from
each other.
6.2 Experimental Results
We ﬁrst measured how many records were vulnerable in
statically anonymized datasets with respect to the infer-
ence attacks we discussed. For this, we modiﬁed two k-
anonymization algorithms, Incognito [6] and Mondrian [7],
and used them as our static (k,c)-anonymization algorithms. 0
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Figure 12: Vulnerability to Inference Attacks
Using these algorithms, we ﬁrst anonymized 5K records and
obtained the ﬁrst “published” datasets. We then generated
ﬁve more subsequent datasets by adding 5K more records
each time. Then we used our vulnerability detection algo-
rithms to count the number of records among these datasets
that are vulnerable to each of inference attack. Figure 12
shows the result. As shown, much more records were found
to be vulnerable in the datasets anonymized by Mondrian.
This is indeed unsurprising, as Mondrian, taking a multidi-
mensional approach, produces datasets with much less gen-
eralization. In fact, for Incognito, even the initial dataset
was highly generalized. This clearly illustrates the unfor-
tunate reality; that is, the more precise data are, the more
vulnerable they are to undesirable inferences.
The next step was to investigate how eﬀectively our ap-
proach would work with a real dataset. The main focus was
its eﬀect on the data quality. As previously discussed, in
order to prevent undesirable inferences, one needs to hide
more information. In our case, it means that the given
data must be generalized until there is no vulnerability to
any type of inference attack. We modiﬁed the static (k,c)-
anonymization algorithms as discussed in Section 5 and
obtained our inf-checked (k,c)-anonymization algorithms.
Note that although we implemented the full-featured algo-
rithms for diﬀerence and intersection attacks, we took a sim-
ple approach for record-tracing attack. That is, we consid-
ered all the edges without removing infeasible/unnecessary
edges as discussed in Section 4.5. We also implemented a
merge approach where we anonymize each dataset indepen-
dently and merge it with the previously released dataset.
Although this approach is secure from any type of inference
attacks, we expected that the data quality would be the
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Figure 13: Data Quality: Average Information Loss
worst, as merging would inevitably have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on generalization (recoding) scheme.
With these algorithms as well as the static anonymiza-
tion algorithms, we repeated our experiment. As before, we
started with 5K records and increased the dataset by 5K
each time. We then checked the vulnerability and measured
the data quality of such datasets. We measured the data
quality both with AIL and DM, and the results are illus-
trated in Figures 13 and 14, respectively. It is clear that
in terms of data quality the inf-checked algorithm is much
superior than the merge algorithm. Although the static al-
gorithms produced the best quality datasets, these data are
vulnerable to inference attacks as previously shown. The
datasets generated by our inf checked algorithm and the
merge algorithm were not vulnerable to any type of inference
attack.
We also note that the quality of datasets generated by the
inf-checked algorithm is not optimal. This was mainly due
to the complexity of checking for diﬀerence attack. Even
though our heuristics to reduce the size of subsets (see Sec-
tion 4.3) were highly eﬀective in most cases, there were some
cases where the size of subsets grew explosively. As such
cases not only caused lengthy execution times, they caused
memory blow-ups. In order to avoid such cases, we set an
upper limit threshold for the size of subsets in this experi-
ment. For example, while our modiﬁed algorithm of Incog-
nito is processing a node in the generalization lattice, if the
size of subsets needed to be checked exceeds the threshold,
we stop the iteration and consider the node as a vulnera-
ble node. Similarly, when we encounter such a case while
considering a split in Mondrian, we stop the check and do
not consider the split. Note that this approach does not af- 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35
D
i
s
c
e
r
n
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
M
e
t
r
i
c
 
(
u
n
i
t
 
=
 
1
M
)
Table Size (unit = 1,000)
Incognito (k=5, c=0.7)
Static
Merge
Inf_Checked
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35
D
i
s
c
e
r
n
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
M
e
t
r
i
c
 
(
u
n
i
t
 
=
 
1
M
)
Table Size (unit = 1,000)
Mondrian (k=5, c=0.7)
Static
Merge
Inf_Checked
Figure 14: Data Quality: Discernibility Metric
fect the security of data, although it may negatively aﬀect
the overall data quality. Even if the optimality cannot be
guaranteed, we believe that the data quality seems to be
still acceptable, considering the results shown in Figures 13
and 14.
Another important comparison was the computational ef-
ﬁciency of these algorithms. Figure 15 shows our experimen-
tal result for each algorithm. The merge algorithm is highly
eﬃcient with respect to execution time (although it was very
ineﬃcient with respect to data quality). As the merge al-
gorithm anonymizes the same sized dataset each time and
merging datasets can be done very quickly, the execution
time is closely constant. While equipped the heuristics and
the data structure discussed in Sections 4.3 and 5.1, the inf-
checked algorithm is still slow. However, considering the
previously discussed results, we believe that this is the price
you have to pay for better data quality and reliable privacy.
Also, when compared to our previous implementation with-
out any heuristics, this is a very promising result.
7. RELATED WORK
While static anonymization has been extensively investi-
gated in the past few years [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11], only a few ap-
proaches address the problem of anonymization in dynamic
environments.
In [12], Sweeney identiﬁed possible inferences when new
records are inserted and suggested two simple solutions.
The ﬁrst solution is that once records in a dataset are
anonymized and released, in any subsequent release of the
dataset, the records must be the same or more generalized.
As previously mentioned, this approach may suﬀer from un-
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Figure 15: Execution Time
necessarily low data quality. Also, this approach cannot
protect newly inserted records from diﬀerence attack, as dis-
cussed in Section 4. The other solution suggested is that
once a dataset is released, all released attributes (including
sensitive attributes) must be treated as the quasi-identiﬁer
in subsequent releases. This approach seems reasonable as
it may eﬀectively prevent linking between records. How-
ever, this approach has a signiﬁcant drawback in that every
equivalence class will inevitable have a homogeneous sensi-
tive attribute value; thus, this approach cannot adequately
control the risk of attribute disclosure.
Yao et al. [15] addressed the inference issue when a single
table is released in the form of multiple views. They pro-
posed several methods to check whether or not a given set
of views violates the k-anonymity requirement collectively.
However, they did not address how to deal with such vio-
lations. Recently, Wang and Fung [13] further investigated
this issue and proposed a top-down specialization approach
to prevent record-linking across multiple anonymous tables.
However, their work does not address how to protect records
that are newly inserted to the dataset.
Recently, Wang and Fung [13] further investigated this is-
sue and proposed a top-down specialization approach to pre-
vent record-linking across multiple anonymous tables. How-
ever, their work focuses on the horizontal growth of data-
bases (i.e., addition of new attributes), and does not address
vertically-growing databases where records are inserted.
In [3], we presented a preliminary limited investigation
concerning the inference problem of dynamic anonymization
with respect to incremental datasets. We identiﬁed some in-
ferences and also proposed an approach where new recordsare directly inserted to the previously anonymized dataset
for computational eﬃciency. However, compared to this cur-
rent work, our previous work has several limitations.The key
diﬀerences of this work with respect to [3] are as follows.
In [3], we focused only on the inference enabling sets that
may exist between two tables, while in this work we consider
more robust and systematic inference attacks in a collection
of released tables. The inference attacks discussed in this
work subsume attacks using inference enabling sets and ad-
dress more sophisticated inferences. For instance, our study
of the record-tracing attack is a new contribution in this
work. We also provide a detailed descriptions of attacks
and algorithms for detecting them. Our previous approach
was also limited to the multidimensional generalization. By
contrast, our current approach considers and is applicable
to both the full-domain and multidimensional approaches;
therefore it can combined with a large variety of anonymiza-
tion algorithms. In this paper we also address the issue of
computational costs in detecting possible inferences. We
discuss various heuristics to signiﬁcantly reduce the search
space, and also suggest a scheme to store the history (of
previously released tables).
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed inference attacks against the
anonymization of incremental data. In particular, we dis-
cussed three basic types of cross-version inference attacks
and presented algorithms for detecting each attack. We
also presented some heuristics to address the eﬃciency of
our algorithms. Based on these ideas, we developed secure
anonymization algorithms for incremental datasets using
two existing anonymization algorithms. We also empirically
evaluated our approach by comparing to other approaches.
Our experimental result showed that our approach outper-
formed other approaches in terms of privacy and data qual-
ity.
For the future work, we are working on essential prop-
erties (e.g, correctness) of our methods and analysis. An-
other interesting direction for the further work is to see if
there are other types of inferences. For instance, one can
devise an attack where more than one type of inference are
jointly utilized. We also plan to investigate inference issues
in more dynamic environments where deletions and updates
of records are allowed.
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